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Abstract
Logical cryptanalysis has been introduced by Massacci and Marraro as a general framework
for encoding properties of crypto-algorithms into SAT problems, with the aim of generating
SAT benchmarks that are controllable and that share the properties of real-world problems and
randomly generated problems.
In this paper, spurred by the proposal of Cook and Mitchell to encode the factorization of large
integers as a SAT problem, we propose the SAT encoding of another aspect of RSA, namely
'nding (i.e. faking) an RSA signature for a given message without factoring the modulus.
Given a small public exponent e, a modulus n and a message m, we can generate a SAT
formula whose models correspond to the eth roots of m modulo n, without encoding the factor-
ization of n or other functions that can be used to factor n. Our encoding can be used to either
generate solved instances for SAT or both satis'able and unsatis'able instances.
We report the experimental results of three solvers, HeerHugo by Groote and Warners, eqsatz
by Li, and smodels by Niemela and Simmons, discuss their performances and compare them
with standard methods based on factoring.
? 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Logical cryptanalysis has been introduced by Massacci and Marraro [28] as a gen-
eral framework for reasoning about a cryptographic algorithm via a translation into
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a problem of (propositional) satis'ability on which fast SAT solvers could be
used.
From the viewpoint of automated reasoning, SAT benchmarks based on logical crypt-
analysis have a number of advantages:
• their natural formulation requires a fairly rich set of connectives which makes it
possible to test formulae beyond CNF;
• they are fairly structured, with abbreviations and de'nitions, as typically happens for
formulae coming from real-world applications, such as hardware veri'cation [8];
• problem instances can be randomly generated in almost inexhaustible numbers, by
varying either the solution or the instance (while keeping the same solution);
• we can control the solution of the instance without making it too easy to solve, in
contrast to standard randomly generated problems for 3-SAT [29,39];
• they are hard to solve and are an excellent test-bed for SAT solvers; and
• sometimes they make possible the representation of attacks or properties that are not
expressible by traditional cryptography.
In a nutshell, we can use logical cryptanalysis to generate hard, random, structured,
solved and controllable instances. Few benchmarks have all these features at once, and
few have such a simple intuitive appeal. 1
In [28] Massacci and Marraro applied this approach to the US Data Encryption
Standard (DES), a symmetric cipher. Symmetric ciphers seem the natural problem
for logical cryptanalysis, as the underlying algorithms are mostly based on bit-wise
operations. Thus, a translation is a matter of patience, toil, and clever tricks [28].
In contrast, public-key (asymmetric) cryptography is based on number theory and is
fairly remote from bit-wise operations. So one may wonder whether it would be possi-
ble at all to encode properties of public-key cryptographic algorithms into satis'ability
algorithms.
In this paper we concentrate on a particular algorithm: the well-known RSA algo-
rithm, proposed in [35,43,47]. The idea of using RSA challenges as a test-bed for SAT
solvers was 'rst proposed by Cook and Mitchell [10] who proposed the factorization
of large integers as a SAT problem:
A SAT instance would be an encoding of a boolean multiplier circuit computing
the known product M from unknown inputs P and Q. Variables are the bits of
P and Q (the inputs of the circuit), together with the outputs of the gates of the
circuit. Clauses assert the correct behaviour of the gates and assert that the output
of the circuit represent the given value of M [ : : : ]
Part of the challenge is to 'nd a suitable multiplier circuit: not too complex
and probably not too deep [ : : : ].
1 The idea of using automated reasoning for breaking a cipher is easier to grasp than the idea of generating
SAT problems by instrumenting CAD systems.
C. Fiorini et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 130 (2003) 101–127 103
The 'rst test of SAT solvers on benchmarks of this kind 2 was done by Groote and
Warners [19] who use their system HeerHugo. As Cook and Mitchell predicted, SAT
solvers are orders of magnitude slower than ad hoc factoring methods.
This was to be expected: research on factoring algorithms has few centuries on its
side (compared to few decades of SAT research) and it has been recently spurred
by the belief that the hardness of factoring is the basis of the security of the RSA
crypto-systems. Recently, the RSA challenge 155 (a number with 512 bits) has been
just factored by a massive parallel search using an advanced factoring algorithm by te
Riele, Cavallar and others [34,47].
Still, the problem of encoding factoring as a SAT problem is simple, compared to
the mathematics involved in the RSA crypto-system: the product of two large primes is
just the 'rst step, followed by modular reductions, exponentiations, and computations
of inverses modulo a congruence.
Cryptographers have spent most of the last 20 years in designing either faster fac-
toring algorithms or attacks on RSA which were not dependent on factorization (see
the excellent survey by Boneh [5]). Indeed, an intriguing problem for cryptographers is
undoubtedly the following: given a message, and a public key, is it possible to generate
a digital signature without knowing the private signature key and without factorization?
The heart of the problem is the computation of the eth root of a number modulo n,
i.e. given three numbers e, n, and m 'nd a number f¡n such that m=femod n. This
operation is easy when the factorization of n is known, or when the Euler function 3
(n) is known. If (n) is known or easily computable then we can also easily factor
n. So, one is interested in a method for extracting the eth root modulo n which does
not use the factorization of n and that cannot be transformed into an eKcient algorithm
for factoring n.
This problem is open [6,5]. There are eKcient algorithms for computing the eth root
when n is prime but no eKcient algorithm has been found when n is composite. Even
the most famous “factoring-free” attacks on RSA by Ha˙stad [21] and Coppersmith [11]
do not provide general purpose algorithms for computing the eth root.
1.1. The contribution of this paper
Here, we show how to encode the computation of eth root modulo n of a number
m¡n, for a small e into a SAT problem: if the formula we provide has a model, we
can extract from the model a solution of the problem: the bit-wise representation of
the root value f such that m= femod n. If the number we tested for has no eth root
(i.e. m is an e non-residue modulo n in number theory terminology) then the formula
is unsatis'able.
From the viewpoint of the RSA crypto-system this is equivalent to saying that we
have encoded the problem of faking an RSA signature without recourse to factorization.
2 The problem was not exactly identical as formulae were added to rule out the trivial factorization of M
into 1 and M . Thus, if M is prime the corresponding formula is unsatis'able.
3 Number of positive integers smaller than n and relatively prime to n.
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To check the eOectiveness of SAT techniques on this problem, we have used state-
of-the-art SAT provers on our encoding. In particular, we have tested our system on
• HeerHugo, by Groote and Warners [19], based on the Sta˙lmark algorithm [20];
• eqsatz, by Li [27], a combination of the traditional Davis–Putnam–Longeman-
Loveland (DPLL) procedure [14,13] with equational reasoning for the aKne sub-
part of the problem; and
• smodels, by Niemela [30] and Niemela and Simmons [31], an eKcient DPLL imple-
mentation of the stable model semantics of logic programs that has some features
in common with HeerHugo.
Other DPLL implementations have also been tested but the one presented here
seemed the most eOective. Other approaches to SAT solving have been ruled out
for theoretical reasons: we already know they would have a poor performance. For
instance, BDD has an exponential blow-up on multiplier circuits [7], and here multi-
plications are ubiquitous. Local search algorithms such as Walk-Sat are eKcient only
on problems having solutions with a robust backbone 4 [41], whereas these backbones
are extremely fragile: by changing any bit of the solution we do not obtain another
solution.
In the experiments on the RSA signature algorithm, we did not expect to be im-
mediately competitive with advanced algorithms based on number theory and factor-
ization. Still, the result is encouraging: a general purpose search algorithm running on
oO-the-shelf hardware can crack limited versions of RSA and shows the same behaviour
of a classical algorithm solving the same problem by factorization (although orders of
magnitude slower). Yet, there is a lot of research work that needs to be done since
the state-of-the-art version of RSA is still out of reach for SAT-based systems. 5
Anyhow, we would not like to stress that “SAT-based attack” point beyond the
reasonable. Indeed, even if trying to “beat a number theorist at his own game” is
tempting, our main interest is SAT research and not number theory and we should
look to this problem from the standpoint of SAT research.
In this respect, we have already stressed the motivations behind our advocacy of
logical cryptanalysis as a SAT benchmark: it provides a set of challenging problems
of industrial relevance as asked for in [38], a hierarchical and regular structure with
abbreviations and de'nitions, and large aKne sub-problems (i.e. formulae with exclu-
sive or), gives the possibility of generating as many random instances as one wants of
both satis'able and unsatis'able nature 6 .
Benchmarks from logical cryptanalysis stretch system performance. Systems that per-
form well on such problems are indeed likely to perform well on many other real-word
problems (as it is indeed the case for eqsatz [27] on the DIMACS parity bit challenge).
4 Loosely speaking, the backbone of a satis'able formula is the set of variables having the same truth-value
in all solutions (satisfying assignments) of the formula.
5 To be precise it is also out of reach for number theoretic algorithms as all known factoring algorithms
are sub-exponential [9,47] and require massive parallelization to be eOective.
6 Strictly speaking, encoding the falsi'cation of RSA signatures can only generate satis'able instances,
but we show that with minor modi'cations unsatis'able instances can also be generated.
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1.2. Plan of the paper
In the rest of the paper we brieQy introduce RSA (Section 2). Then we present the
basic ideas behind logical cryptanalysis of RSA by encoding cubic root extraction as a
SAT problem (Section 3) and give the detail of the encoding (Section 4). We explain
how to generate satis'able and unsatis'able instances (Section 5) and report of our
experimental analysis (Section 6). Brief conclusions (Section 7) end the paper.
2. A primer on RSA
RSA is a public-key crypto-system developed in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and
Leonard Adleman [35]. It is a widely used algorithm for providing privacy and ensuring
authenticity of digital data. The RSA system uses modular arithmetic to transform a
message (represented as a number or a sequence of numbers) into unreadable ciphertext.
Here we give the essential mathematical features of the algorithm and refer to the
PKCS#1 standard by RSA Security [36] or to general books on computer security
[37,43,47] for the technical complications arising in practical implementations such as
padding messages with random strings, using hash functions, etc.
Denition 1. Let n = p · q be the product of two large primes. Let e be an integer
co-prime with (n) = (p − 1)(q − 1), the Euler function of n. Let d be the integer
solution of the equation ed=1mod(n). We call n the modulus, e the public exponent
and d the private exponent. The pair 〈e; n〉 is called public key and the pair 〈d; n〉 is
the corresponding private key.
The public key is widely distributed whereas the private key must be kept secret.
Denition 2 (Message signature and veri'cation). Let 〈e; n〉 be a public key and m¡n
be a message. To sign 7 m, the agent holding the corresponding private key pair 〈d; n〉
computes the integer f such that f=mdmod n. To verify that f is the signature of a
message m one computes m′ =femod n where 〈e; n〉 is the public key, and accepts f
as valid only if m′ = m.
The intuition is that we can be sure that the signature is authentic because only the
holder of the private key could have generated it, though everybody can verify it by
using the public key.
In practical applications, a typical size for n is 1024 bits, so each factor is about
512 bits long. As for the sizes of e and d, it is common to choose a small public
exponent for the public key, to make veri'cation faster than signing. For instance,
several security standards [23,3,36] recommend either 3 or 65537 (corresponding to
216 + 1), without signi'cantly degrading the RSA security level.
7 In the sequel we use the letter f for the Italian word “'rma” for signature.
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For a “total break” of the RSA crypto-system an attacker needs an algorithm for
recovering the private exponent d from a public key 〈e; n〉: this would enable him to
forge signatures at wish. For a “local deduction”, it is suKcient to recover the signature
f of a given message m using only the knowledge of m and the public key 〈e; n〉.
A total break can be obtained only by 'nding an eKcient algorithm for factoring
the modulus n into its two prime factors p and q: from p, q and e it is easy to get d,
the private exponent using Euclid’s greatest common divisor algorithm. The converse
is also true: from d one can eKciently recover the factorization of n [5,9,47].
We cannot discuss here the various Qavors of factoring algorithms and refer to
[26,9,47] for details. We just note that the best general-purpose factoring algorithm to-
day is the probabilistic Number Field Sieve, which runs in expected time
O(e1:9223(ln n)
1=3(ln ln n)2=3 ). Older methods are usually faster on “small” numbers: for in-
stance, Pollard’s  method is better for numbers having small factors (say up to 10
decimal digits) and the Elliptic curve method works well for 'nding factors up to 30
–40 digits [25].
The most important observation about factoring is that all known algorithms require
at least a sub-exponential amount of time in the number of bits of the modulus and
the most eOective ones also sub-exponential space [9,47,40]. The last RSA Challenge
that was factored is a 512-bit modulus [34]. The total amount of computer time spent
using the Number Field Sieve factoring algorithm was estimated to be the equivalent
of 8000 MIPS years. So, the state-of-the-art in factoring is still far from posing a threat
when RSA is used properly [40].
Thus, a number of researchers have worked on methods that try to decrypt messages
or obtain signatures of messages without factoring the RSA modulus n. Some of these
attacks, most notably those due to Ha˙stad [21] and Coppersmith [11], make it possible
to fake signature or to decrypt particular messages without factoring the modulus under
certain circumstances.
The Common Modulus Attack on RSA is an example of a local deduction: a possible
RSA implementation gives everyone the same n, but diOerent values for the exponents
e and d. However, if the same message is ever encrypted with two diOerent exponents
with the same modulus, then the plaintext can be recovered without either of the
decryption exponents. This and similar attacks can be thwarted by suitably padding
messages with independent random values.
Yet, there is no algorithm for performing local deductions in the general case: given
an arbitrary (small) public exponent e, a modulus n, and a message m, compute a
signature f such that f would pass the veri'cation test m = femod n, without the
preliminary factorization of n.
If we “invert” the m=femod n equation into e
√
mmod n=f, we can see that we just
need an algorithm to extract the eth root modulo n of an integer m¡n. If n is prime,
many eKcient algorithms are known either using direct methods or based on the index
calculus [9,47, Section 1.6]. For instance, if e = 2 and n is prime we can compute
square roots in time O(log4n). However, when n is composite, and even if e is a small
number such as 3, there is no general method for 'nding eth roots which does not use
the factorization of n (or something that can be used for eKciently factoring n). See
[5,6] for a more comprehensive discussion.
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3. Logical cryptanalysis of RSA
The main intuition behind logical cryptanalysis as introduced in [28] is that we
should represent a cryptographic transformation C = EK (P), where P is the plaintext,
C is the ciphertext, and K is the key, with a suitable logical formula.
If we choose propositional logic, then we must encode each bit sequence P; C; K as
a sequence of propositional variables P;C;K in which every variable is true when the
corresponding bit is 1 and false when it is 0. Then the properties of the transforma-
tion are encoded with a logical formula E(P;C;K) which is true if and only if the
cryptographic transformation holds for the corresponding bit sequences.
For a symmetric cipher such as DES, the choice of the cryptographic transformation
is almost obvious (the encryption or decryption algorithm) and the diKcult part is just
the translation.
For RSA, the situation is not so simple: we have three known values e, n and m,
and a number of equations to choose from.
If we choose n= p · q, we can represent factoring as a SAT problem as suggested
by Cook and Mitchell [10]. The hardness of this SAT problem has been already in-
vestigated by Groote and Warner [19].
Since a “total break” of the algorithm is unlikely, we might prefer to encode the
computation, via a SAT encoding, of the eth root modulo n of m. In this case we have
two options:
f = mdmod n holds ⇔ RSA(m; d; f ; n) is true; (1)
m= femod n holds ⇔ RSA(f ; e;m; n) is true: (2)
The 'rst choice seems to be preferable as a model of the formula yields a value for the
private key. Unfortunately, it has too many unknowns and therefore too many solutions
which would not pass the veri'cation test m=femod n. For instance, if we set 〈3; 55〉
as the public key and 9 as the message, we could 'nd 16=94 mod 55 as a solution of
the equation f = mdmod n but unfortunately 9 = 163 mod 55 = 26.
Thus, the solution seems just picking up a combinatorial circuit that takes e, f and
n as inputs and has m= femodm as output. Then, we could just “update” Cook and
Mitchell’s idea: “variables are the bits of e, f, and n (the inputs of the circuit), together
with the outputs of the gates of the circuit. Clauses assert the correct behaviour of the
gates and assert that the outputs of the circuit represent the given value of m.”
This simple idea turns out to be unfeasible: there is no combinatorial circuit for
modular exponentiation. The algorithms used in practice reduce it to a sequence of
modular multiplications based on the principle of “square-and-multiply” [9,47]. Loosely
speaking we may represent this procedure as follows:
m0 = 1;
mi+1 = (m2i + ei · f)mod n;
where ei is 0 (resp. 1) if the corresponding ith bit of the binary representation of e
has the value 0 (resp. 1). The desired value m is obtained at mlog e+1.
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If we assume that e can be arbitrary, our encoding into satis'ability must take into
account the largest possible value of e (that is log e ∼ log n). Then, we must encode
logn modular multiplications most of which will turn out to be just useless as they
would not be activated.
If we are just worried about correctness, this problem is immaterial. The fragment
of the formula corresponding to the inactivated modular multiplication steps will not
change the solutions of the problem: any model of the formula would still yield an eth
root of m modulo n. When ve is replaced for e in the formula, unit propagation will
set the appropriate values of the inputs of each mi.
The major problem is that, from the viewpoint of the SAT solver this would be a
disaster. The solver has no way to know that we do not care for the values of variables
corresponding to inactivated modular multiplication steps. Syntactic analysis would not
help it, since one of the operands of the multiplication is the signature f. The solver
will have to search in that subspace too and we have no guarantee that the search
heuristics will recognize that this search is actually pointless.
Moreover, the size of the problem would become huge even for small n. If we assume
that the square-and-multiply step can be encoded using the best possible multipliers
and only O(log n log log n) gates, the encoding of the RSA signature algorithm for a
modulus of 100 bits would require over 100 000 formulae. If we use standard parallel
multipliers we would need over 1 000 000 formulae.
So a smarter encoding is needed. At 'rst, it should be possible to introduce more
variables in RSA(f ; e;m; n) besides m; f ; e, and n, and make use of abbreviations
and de'nitions. Still, if the encoding is well designed, then m; f ; e, and n should be
the only control variables of the problem, i.e. 'xing their values should determine the
values of all other variables. Thus, if we replace the variables m; e, and n with their
respective 0=1 values vm; ve, and vn the control variables in RSA(f ; ve; vm; vn) should be
only f .
Another desirable property of the encoding is that it should be possible to use
RSA(vf; ve;m; vn) and unit propagation to directly compute vm.
Our solution is to use the same trick used for the encoding of DES with a variable
number of rounds [28]: given e, run the algorithm at the meta-level and encode only
the modular multiplications which actually take place.
Rather than using the correspondence set in (2) we must use the following one:
m= femod n holds ⇔ RSAe(f ;m; n) is true; (3)
where the value of e is a parameter of the encoding.
4. Encoding modular exponentiation into SAT
So far, we have reduced ourselves to the problem of representing in logic the modular
congruence in (2), where the value of e is handled diOerently from the values of m,
f and n in the encoding.
As we have already noted, the public exponent e does not need to be a very large
number, and security standards [23,3,36] recommend a value such as 3 or 65 537
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(corresponding to 216 + 1), thus limiting the number of modular multiplications to,
respectively, 2 or 17.
For the sake of simplicity, and since the particular problem is as hard as the general
one [5,9,47], in this work we choose the value e=3 and consequently Eq. (2) can be
rewritten in the form
m= ((f · f)mod n · f)mod n: (4)
According to (4), the exponentiation can be plainly carried out by iterating a modular
multiplication twice.
At 'rst, emphasis should be on eKcient implementations of modular multipliers. If
we look at modular multipliers, many designs have been proposed in the literature,
ranging from look-up table-based structures for small moduli [42,24,32,15], to devices
restricted to speci'c moduli [33,44,22], to architectures suitable for medium and large
moduli and using only arithmetic and logic components [16,1,45,2,22].
Also in this case, just picking up a multiplier would not do the job:
• f and the factors p and q of the modulus n are unknown in our setting and this
makes solutions in which they are hardwired in the implementation impossible to
use;
• we must use a purely combinatorial multiplier since sequential operations 8 are not
readily representable in propositional logic;
• the implementation must reduce the use of number theoretic features as much as pos-
sible (relatively simple number theoretic operations like the Euclid greatest common
divisor algorithm are diKcult to encode into propositional logics).
The constraints rule out many of the recent algorithms for modular multiplication pub-
lished in the literature.
Thus, we singled out the multiplication structure described in [1] since it features a
simple purely combinatorial formulation.
The basic intuition behind the method is the following: given two integers x and y
represented in the range [0; n) by b=log n bits, the multiplication of x times y modulo
n yields a non-negative integer  such that
= (x · y)mod n= x · y − k · n;
where k= 
(x ·y)=n. Note that x ·y requires 2b bits for representation, while  is still
represented on b bits.
We can see that the computation can be reduced to compute the integer k. Once we
get the value of k right, the rest are just the standard operations of addition, subtraction
and multiplication between integers.
However, division is a complex operation and it is simpler to compute an approx-
imate value of k and then subtract the error. So, we split the computation of k into
the product of (x · y) · (1=n) and approximate the computation of 1=n by a fraction t
having as many digits as required to evaluate k by a number kap diOering from the
8 A sequential implementation of modular exponentiation repeatedly applies the combinatorial algorithm
until some condition is reached.
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true value by at the most 1. Namely, if t is the number obtained limiting 1=n at the
'rst r fractional bits, the following inequalities hold:
t6 1=n¡ t + 2−r
and multiplying both sides by x · y
x · y · t6 (x · y)=n¡x · y · t + x · y · 2−r :
From the latter inequalities it is immediate to see that replacing 
(x ·y)=n by (x ·y) · t
the maximum error is bounded by E = x · y · 2−r and imposing the constraint E¡ 1,
it must be r¿ 2b. Indeed, under this assumption, we have
E¡ 22b · 2−r6 1:
Denoting the value 






x · y · t + E= 
kap + Fract(x · y · t) + E
= kap + 
Fract(x · y · t) + E= kap + E′:
Since 06Fract(x · y · t) + E¡ 2, E′ must be 0 or 1.
Finally, the modular product  is expressed by the relation
= x · y − kap · n− E′ · n:
To obtain , the expression x · y− kap · n must be computed and tested against n: if it
is less than n, it is correct (E′ = 0); otherwise n must be further subtracted. Note that
always 0¡x · y − kap · n¡ 2n, that is this value is correctly represented by means of
b+1 bits and thus only the b+1 less signi'cant bits of x · y and of x · y− kap · n are
necessary for the computation, reducing the formula complexity.
The structure that implements the described algorithm is shown in Fig. 1: it mainly
consists of three binary multipliers and two binary adders. Multiplier MUL1 produces
x · y, that in turn is multiplied by constant t through a 2b× 2b multiplier MUL2. The
4b-bits MUL2 output contains the representation of kap in the interval from bit position
2b−1 to bit position 3b. This representation is multiplied by constant −n by multiplier
MUL3 to produce x · y − kap · n. Finally, values x · y − kap · n and x · y − kap · n − n
are yielded by adders ADD1 and ADD2, and the 'nal result  is chosen, depending
on the sign of the latter value.
The algorithmic structure of Fig. 1 can be easily expressed in the notation of propo-
sition logic, joining sub-expressions drawn for single components.
As for adders and multipliers, the former are modeled by ripple-carry adders. At
'rst, this choice may appear rather ineKcient in respect of faster solutions, like carry
look-ahead adders or carry-save adders (CLA or CSA), but our preliminary experiments
showed that the superior circuit performance does not guarantee a similar eKciency of
SAT solvers on the encoding. This phenomenon is also frequent in hardware veri'cation
[8]: simpler and unoptimized circuits are easier to analyze than optimized ones because
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Fig. 1. Structure of the modulo n multiplier.
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Fig. 2. Boolean equations of a ripple-carry adder for b-bits.
Fig. 3. An b× b array multiplier for b = 3.
the latter use complex boolean functions. A b-bit ripple carry adder is described in
Fig. 2 joining the bit-wise equations of a full adder cell, where Ai; Bi are the ith bits
of operands and Ci; Ci+1 are the ith and the next carry bits.
Array multiplying structures were chosen for multiplication. The multiplication of
two b-bits numbers can be easily implemented by an array with b rows and 2b − 1
columns of full/half adders, as shown in Fig. 3 in the case b = 3. Generalizing the
structure of Fig. 3, it is easy to derive the set of boolean expressions for an n×n array
multiplier shown in Fig. 4.
As for multipliers, one may again argue that one could have used Wallace multipliers
or the recursive construction due to Karatsuba. We ruled them out for the same reasons
that led us to prefer ripple carry adders to CLAs.
Finally, the expressions in (2) and(4) are combined to produce the logical description
of the operation "(; x; y; n) representing the modular product =(x·y)mod n. Iterating
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Fig. 4. Boolean equations of an array multiplier
the process twice, the 'nal result is
m= f3 mod n holds⇔RSA3(f ;m; n) is true
⇔"(m′; f ; f ; n) ∧"(m; f ;m′; n) is true;
where m′ is just the result of f2 mod n.
5. Generating satisable and unsatisable instances
This encoding makes it possible to generate both satis'able and unsatis'able SAT
instances.
The simplest way to generate solved satis5able instances is to use the SAT solver
to search for fake RSA signatures according to the following procedure:
(1) randomly generate a public key 〈e; n〉;
(a) randomly generate a signature f;
(b) compute m= femod n;
(c) transform the numbers m, f, and n into the corresponding boolean values
vm; vfve, vn;
(d) substitute in RSAef ;m; n) the corresponding boolean values that we have so
far generated but for f.
The pair 〈vf;RSAe(f ; vm; vn)〉 gives a solved instance of the satis'ability problem. Since
RSA was designed to be hard to break, this will provide us with the hard-solved
instances asked for by Cook and Mitchell [10].
If we want to generate just satis5able instances we skip step 1(a) and replace step
1(b) with the following:
1(b′) randomly generate a message m;
The formula RSAe(f ; vm; vn) is a satis'able instance of the satis'ability problem. If
we 'x also n, then we can generate an inexhaustible number of similar instances just
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by concatenating the randomly generated unit clauses corresponding to the description
of vm with the (constant) formula RSAe(f ;m; vn).
However, there is no way to generate an unsatis'able formula by just changing f
and m if e and n are chosen according to De'nition 1. Indeed, the condition that e
is co-prime with (n) ensures that the equation m = femod n always has a solution.
Whereas this is desired for the RSA cryptosystem, 9 it is a bit annoying if we are
interested in the use of RSA to generate hard SAT benchmarks.
However, we do not need any modi'cation to the encoding to generate both satis'-
able and unsatis'able instances. We simply need to change the benchmark generation
as follows:
(1) randomly generate a public key 〈e; n〉 where e violates De'nition 1 and divides
(n), i.e. e divides either p− 1 or q− 1 if n= pq;
(a) randomly generate a message m;
(b) transform the numbers m, f, and n into the corresponding boolean values
vm; vfve; vn;
(c) substitute in RSAe(f ;m; n) the corresponding boolean values that we have so
far generated but for f.
If e divides (n) the equation m=femod n may not have a solution, i.e. the formula
RSAe(f ; vm; vn) is satis5able i6 m is an eth residue modulo n. This problem is also
hard, and substantially equivalent to the original RSA problem, and thus we have a
general way to generate both satis'able and unsatis'able numbers.
An intriguing observation is that in number theory there is no way to show a proof
that a number m is not an eth residue 10 modulo n: we can only show a proof that
a number is a residue by exhibiting the solution f. Here, a resolution proof of
the unsatis'ability of RSAe(f ; vm; vn) gives the desired proof that m is not an eth
residue.
6. Experimental analysis
To automate the benchmark generation, we have designed and implemented a pro-
gram to generate the encoding RSAe(f ;m; vn) where the modulus n can be a number of
arbitrary size (i.e. possibly larger than the current C implementation of integers using
32=64 bits).
6.1. The experimental setting
For our experiments we have generated both solved instances and SAT/UNSAT
instances, according to the methodology that we have presented in Section 5. The
building blocks shared by both methods are schematized in Fig. 5.
9 These properties simply guarantee that every message can be decrypted.
10 In contrast, we can exhibit a short proof that a number is prime [9].
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Fig. 6. Transformation of the scheme.
The elements represented in Fig. 5 are the followings
• the random generator generates the pair of prime numbers p and q, factors of the
modulus n, and possibly the signature f;
• the preprocessor processes the input data (p; q and f) in order to calculate the
binary output data where −n is the opposite in two-complement of the modulus, t is
the approximated value of 1=n, m is the message obtained from the modular product
f3 mod n (if solved instances are sought);
• the encoder encodes the input data in the format of the system and sends them in
output with b, that symbolizes the number of bits of n;
• the system uses the formula RSA3(f ; vm; vn) and the other input data to search a
model that satis'es the input formula.
We slightly modi'ed the above schema to make experiments reproducible, i.e. we
have stored at least some of the moduli and some of the signatures. Thus, Fig. 6 shows
the transformation of the scheme in Fig. 5.
For the “random generator” and the “preprocessor”, we have used the software pack-
age LIP by Lenstra [25] containing a variety of functions for arithmetic on arbitrarily
large integers.
The word “Solver” denotes eqsatz [27], HeerHugo [19], smodels [31] and other
systems we have tested. HeerHugo is a saturation base procedure which uses a variant
of the Sta˙lmark algorithm based on clauses, and eqsatz is a variant of DPLL which
includes equational reasoning for dealing with exclusive or, smodels is an eKcient
DPLL implementation of the stable model semantics of logic programs that has some
features in common with HeerHugo.
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Fig. 7. The saturation method by HeerHugo.
Fig. 8. The DPLL method by eqsatz.
The core algorithm for HeerHugo is sketched in Fig. 7. For any given formula, there
is a value of k for which the formula is either proved unsatis'able or satis'able. Thus,
search is simply a form of iterative deepening in which the algorithm is called with
increasing values of k until a solution is found. For further details see [19].
The core algorithm for eqsatz is sketched in Fig. 8. It is a fast implementation of
the classical DPLL branching algorithm [13] enhanced with a special sub-routine that
recognizes subset of clauses representing aKne formulae (i.e. formulae representable
with exclusive or as the only connective) and applies specialized rules to that subset.
For further details see [27].
The core algorithm for smodels is sketched in Fig. 9. It applies the classical DPLL
branching algorithm [13] to logic programs with negation as failure and the stable
model semantics. The advantage of logic programs is that we must only specify positive
rules, i.e. rules to make variables true, since everything else is false by default. As a
result, the size of the input problem halves w.r.t. a clausal representation. The program
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Fig. 9. The DPLL method by smodels.
Fig. 10. The reference Pollard- method.
also has a look ahead step which is fairly similar to the merge rule of HeerHugo. For
further details see [30,31].
On top of smodels we have added a preprocessing step that is already incorporated
in HeerHugo and eqsatz: substantially we apply various forms of unit propagation and
simpli'cation to make the formula smaller before doing any actual search. For further
details on the simpli'er see [17].
To check how SAT algorithm scaled w.r.t. classical algorithm for computing cube
roots we have also run a parallel test using Pollard- method as the underlying factor-
ization method. This control algorithm is sketched in Fig. 10. We have not used more
advanced algorithms (such as the Elliptic Curves Method or the General Number Field
Sieve) because they are competitive only when the number of decimal digits of the
modulus n is over 10, far too large a number for our limited hardware and for our
SAT solvers.
The experiments were run on an Alpha with 256 MB of memory, a Pentium II with
64 MB of memory, and a Pentium III with 512 MB of memory. All computers run
Linux as the operating system. No run was timed out.
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We have not reported the sizes of the instances in a table since they can be exactly
calculated from the structure shown in Fig. 1 and they are around O(6 log2 n). To
give a feeling of the orders of magnitude, the encoding for a 22-bits modulus, after
compacting, unit propagation and applying the unary failed-literal rule [12] has 40 016
clauses and over 7000 variables. The RSA-129 challenge given by Martin Gardner in
Scienti5c American in 1977 (see [47, p. 320] for a more recent reference) is encoded
with 6 604 076 formulae (before preprocessing).
In contrast with the encoding of the state-of-the-art version of DES, which takes a
“paltry” 60 000 clauses and nonetheless is hard to solve [28], the number of clauses is
much bigger in this case.
6.2. Generation of solved instances (faking RSA signature)
For solved instances the generation of the benchmark suite worked as follows:
(1) 'x the number of bits of the RSA modulus we are interested in;
(2) randomly generate a modulus n as the product of two random primes;
(3) randomly generate 50 signatures;
(4) for each generated signature f do
(a) apply the modular exponentiation algorithm using the RSA public key 〈e; n〉
and generate the message m= femod n (here e = 3);
(b) encode the modular exponentiation algorithm as RSAe(f ;m; n) and substitute
the values of the message vm and the modulus vn;
(c) search for a model of the formula using a SAT solver.
If at step 2 we do not check whether e = 3 divides (n), the message m must be
computed as the eth power of a given f. Otherwise the formula may not be satis'able.
To test for correctness we always check that what we found out was indeed a correct
signature.
If a model exists we have found a cubic root of m modulo n, i.e. we have been
able to fake the RSA signature of message m for the public key 〈3; n〉.
In Table 1 we show a sample of the results to give a feeling of the orders of
magnitudes of running times of diOerent solvers. We report
• the modulus,
• the number of bits of the modulus,
• the signature,
• and for each system the running time (in s, h and days).
HeerHugo showed the worst performance and we had to stop the experiments when
they required more than 10 days to solve one instance. eqsatz was by far the fastest, if
the formula is suKciently small to 't into the processor’s cache. 11 As soon as the size
11 Retrospectively, this was to be expected as satz, the core of eqsatz without rules for exclusive or, has
been optimized for running on randomly generated CNF at the cross-over point and thus for around few
hundred variables and around few thousand clauses.
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Table 1
Sample of results of the faking RSA signature experiments
Mod. Bit Sign. Smodels Heer. SATZ Pol.
6 3 4 0:02 s 2:00 s 0:11 s 0:01 s
6 3 5 0:00 s 2:00 s 0:09 s 0:01 s
49 6 9 0:42 s 45:00 s 0.44 0:02 s
49 6 48 0:23 s 45:00 s 0.44 0:01 s
143 8 104 0:71 s 2915 s 2:06 s 0:07 s
143 8 123 1:57 s 3321 s 2:07 s 0:07 s
667 10 128 0:89 s 5 h 2012 s 19:12 s 0:09 s
667 10 276 5:43 s 1 d 20 h 3207 s 19:13 s 0:09 s
2 501 12 96 30:09 s 3 h 3090 s 2:48 s 0:13 s
2 501 12 1 259 21:11 s 3 d 04 h 2943 s 2:45 s 0:13 s
7 597 13 497 229:80 s 4 d 01 h 3090 s 5.89 0:16 s
7 597 13 7 258 190:37 s 3 d 16 h 2002 s 7.00 0:16 s
29 213 15 8 304 20:67 s 11 d 04 h 0620 s 4:92 s 0:19 s
29 213 15 27 704 491:65 s 5 d 07 h 2291 s 31:39 s 0:19 s
156 263 18 80 465 1189 s 7 d 10 h 3388 s 8:32 s 0:21 s
156 263 18 53 477 1 h 2699 s 6 d 13 h 1099 s 11:05 s 0:21 s
455 369 19 84 882 8 h 3578 s 10 d 16 h 2118 s 1204 s 0:23 s
455 369 19 405 346 1 h 1948 s 10 d 05 h 3482 s 923 s 0:23 s
2 923 801 22 1 847 296 20 h 0311 s — 1423 s 0:25 s
2 923 801 22 1 983 121 11 h 3500 s – 2 d 11 h 2708 s 0:25 s
13 340 267 24 3 958 651 14 h 0598 s – – –
13 340 267 24 11 376 425 7 h 0467 s – – –
28 049 353 25 18 67 233 1 d 03 h 1744 s – – –
28 049 353 25 20 910 282 19 h 1934 s – – –
183 681 697 28 92 751 060 17 h 2721 s – – –
183 681 697 28 114 808 473 1 d 12 h 0077 s – – –
504 475 141 29 301 368 039 1 d 03 h 1346 s – – –
504 475 141 29 273 472 864 2 d 08 h 2055 s – – –
of the problem increases beyond that point its performance is no longer predictable.
Thus, we decided to use smodels which oOered a good compromise between speed and
stability of performance for larger moduli.
To measure the scalability of the SAT solvers we have used the methodology pro-
posed by Fleming and Wallace [18], as we have run the experiments on diOerent
machines and at diOerent times. This means that for every size of the modulus (in
bits) we compute the geometric mean of the running time and then divide that mean
time by the geometric mean time that the system has taken on the smallest modulus.
In a nutshell, the time for computing a cube root modulo a 3-bit number is the
reference problem and all other values are normalized by that number. For instance,
using the data in Table 1 for HeerHugo we would have
t3bits =
√
2:00 s · 2:00 s = 2:00 s;
t6bits =
√
45:00 s · 45:00 s = 45:00 s;
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Fig. 11. Comparison of HeerHugo–SATZ–Pollard normalized running times.
t8bits =
√






















Note that the 'nal value is not a dimensional measure (i.e. s, h, etc.) but just a
comparative indication. In other words, Nt8bits = 1555:69 means that HeerHugo runs
1555 times slower on moduli of 8 bits than it runs on moduli of 3 bits.
The results are reported in Fig. 11.
The Qattening of the curves on the logarithmic scale shown by smodels, HeerHugo,
and Pollard (a factoring algorithm) is consistent with the worst case complexity of
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factoring algorithms, namely a sub-exponential 12 algorithm in the number of bits of
the modulus.
6.3. Generation of SAT/UNSAT instances (solving cubic residuosity)
To analyze the relative hardness of satis'able/unsatis'able instances, we followed
the systematic approach used in the analysis of Random-CNF [39]. In our setting, this
boils down to the following algorithm:
(1) 'x the number of bits of the RSA modulus we are interested in;
(2) generate randomly a modulus n as the product of two random primes of appropriate
size such that e= 3 divides (n), since we want both satis'able and unsatis'able
instances;
(3) for all possible values of m= 0 : : : n− 1 do
(a) encode the modular exponentiation algorithm as RSAe(f ;m; n) and substitute
the values of the message vm and the modulus vn;
(b) search for a model of the formula using a SAT solver.
If a model exists we have found a cubic root of the value m modulo n. If the formula
is unsatis'able we showed that m is a cubic non-residue modulo n.
Note that a systematic approach is necessary because we want an indication of
the relative diKculty of the sat/unsat cases and there is no general (and eKcient)
algorithm to provably generate residue and non-residues modulo n. The same procedure
is followed by Selman et al. [39] to explore the hardness of the Random-CNF SAT
benchmark. Clearly, to determine whether a particular m is a cubic non-residue there
is no need of generating all possible values from 1 to n: it is enough to test the
satis'ability of the single formula RSAe(f ;m; n) with the values of the message vm
and the modulus vn. To generate benchmarks with larger formulae, when a systematic
sweep of the search space is no longer possible, the messages m can be generated at
random.
On this benchmark we have run only the smodels system because it oOered the
best compromise between speed and predictability of running time (i.e. for the same
modulus we have not found an instance requiring 2 days and another requiring 30 min
as we had with eqsatz).
In Table 2 we show a sample of the results, to give an indication of the order of
magnitude of running times on the entire search space for a small modulus 35 = 5 · 7.
Here, we also indicate the number of choice points and the running time in seconds.
“n.r” means that the number in the column MSG is a non-residue modulo 35.
Note how satis'able and unsati'able instances are well distributed and that satis'able
instances require practically no choices. The solver is suKciently smart to 'nd the
solution without substantial search.
In Table 3 we show more quantitative data, namely average running time for sat-
is'able and unsatis'able instances. The 'rst table shows the result when the modulus
12 Recall that on a logarithmic scale an exponential algorithm is mapped into a straight line.
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Table 2
Sample of results for solving cubic residuosity
Mod. Msg Sign. Choice Time
35 0 0 0 0.170
35 1 16 0 0.200
35 2 n.r. 14 0.690
35 3 n.r. 22 0.840
35 4 n.r. 19 0.840
35 5 n.r. 21 0.720
35 6 26 1 0.270
35 7 28 5 0.370
35 8 32 0 0.180
35 9 n.r. 18 0.750
35 10 n.r. 14 0.700
35 11 n.r. 20 0.820
35 12 n.r. 22 0.880
35 13 17 0 0.310
35 14 14 7 0.500
35 15 25 1 0.260
35 16 n.r. 18 0.780
35 17 n.r. 20 0.790
35 18 n.r. 14 0.660
35 19 n.r. 21 0.820
35 20 20 1 0.230
35 21 21 2 0.240
35 22 18 0 0.210
35 23 n.r. 20 0.880
35 24 n.r. 19 0.840
35 25 n.r. 18 0.880
35 26 n.r. 14 0.690
35 27 13 1 0.220
35 28 7 5 0.390
35 29 4 2 0.210
35 30 n.r. 14 0.680
35 31 n.r. 20 0.870
35 32 n.r. 14 0.710
35 33 n.r. 14 0.690
35 34 24 0 0.220
n is a prime of size up to 6 bits (an easy problem in number theory) and the second
table shows the results when n is composite, i.e. the product of two such primes.
In the table we report:
• the number of bits of the modulus,
• the number of tested instances for all moduli with that size,
• the relative percentage of SAT/UNSAT instances, and
• for each type of instances (SAT/UNSAT) the average number of choice points and
the average running time in seconds.
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Table 3
Quantitative results for solving cubic residuosity
All instances SAT instances UNSAT instances
Bits Instances %SAT %UNSAT Choices Time Choices Time
Results when the modulus is a small prime
3 12 67% 33% 1 0.04 2 0.04
4 24 67% 33% 2 0.08 5 0.13
5 119 73% 27% 4 0.19 9 0.23
6 37 35% 65% 5 0.27 21 0.79
Results when the modulus is the product of two small primes
6 90 78% 22% 9 0.43 18 0.78
7 815 50% 50% 14 0.96 40 1.99
8 2242 51% 49% 25 2.59 75 5.57
9 4271 50% 50% 50 6.09 153 15.66
10 2999 26% 74% 65 12.49 297 49.02
We have not given the overall average running time as the data can be substan-
tially bi-partite in two regions, one for unsatis'able formulae and one for satis'able
formulae.
In contrast with Random-CNF benchmarks [39], in this benchmark the hardness
of the problem is unrelated to phenomena-like phase transitions in the satis'ablity/
unsatis'ability ratio of instances.
6.4. What the benchmark tells on di6erent systems
The diOerence in performance between HeerHugo and eqsatz is signi'cant because
both systems have reduction rules beyond unit propagation that are able to cope with
aKne sub-formulae in quite eOective ways and that are fairly similar. For instance,
both systems have rules to derive p↔ q and then replace q with p everywhere in the
formula.
Apparently, HeerHugo breadth 'rst search system is not very eOective unless a proof
of unsatis'ability can be easily found. In all other cases, the memory requirement of the
procedure and the necessity of a substantially exhaustive case analysis of many control
variables (the branch-merge phase for larger k) before a solution is found make the
procedure not suitable. In contrast eqsatz, even if its underlying proof system is less
strong than the proof system of HeerHugo, can relatively quickly head for a solution.
An (expected) consequence of this diOerence in the search procedure is that HeerHugo
is much more reliable than eqsatz regarding the variance of running times.
The benchmark was also good in pointing the “short-lived” nature of the optimized
coding of the data structures of eqsatz: on larger benchmarks, when the problem in-
stance could no longer 't into the processor’s cache, the performance of the solver be-
comes unpredictable. Most likely, this large variance in performance can be explained
by the need of swapping data to and from the main memory.
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What is more signi'cant is the relatively good performance of smodels whose
proof system is de'nitely weaker than both HeerHugo and eqsatz. Apparently, only
the unsatis'able part of the merge rules in HeerHugo seems to pay oO in these
examples.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how to encode the problem of 'nding (i.e. faking) an
RSA signature for a given message without factoring the modulus. This corresponds to
computing the eth root modulo n (e-residuosity modulo n). In the number theory 'eld
no solution to this problem is known, when n is not a prime, without a preliminary
step equivalent to factoring n.
We have shown how the encoding of the eth residuosity modulo n problem can
be used for generating solved instances and satis'able and unsatis'able instances. Our
encoding extends the set of number theoretic problem that can be used to generate
SAT benchmarks over the initial proposal by Cook and Mitchell [10]: factoring large
integers by encoding the problem into SAT and using SAT solvers.
We believe that using such cryptographic benchmark can be bene'cial for SAT
research as they combine into one framework the properties of structured problems
and randomly generated problems and namely:
• they require a rich set of connectives which makes it possible to test formulae beyond
CNF;
• they are structured as typically happens for formulae coming from real-world appli-
cations;
• problem instances can be randomly generated in almost inexhaustible numbers, by
varying either the solution or the instance (while keeping the same solution) or both;
• we can control the nature of the instance (satis'able or unsatis'able) without making
it too easy to solve;
• last but not least they are interesting problems on their own (and whose importance
is much easier to grasp for the layman than the n-queen puzzle or the DIMACS
parity problem).
The experiments on SAT provers, HeerHugo by Groote and Warners [19], eqsatz by
Li [27], and smodels by Niemela and Simmons [30] show that SAT solvers are well
behind number theoretic algorithms which solve the same problem using factoring but
are not totally hopeless.
The 'rst avenue of future research is the testing of other algorithms which are
able to exploit the presence of aKne sub-problems even more than HeerHugo and
eqsatz. Indeed, in contrast with the encoding of DES reported in [28], here the aKne
sub-problem is almost 50% of the whole formula. A possible approach is to apply
algorithms such as those by Warners and Van Maaren [46] as a preprocessing phase;
another approach is to test the eOectiveness of specialized calculi which integrate more
closely aKne and clausal logic such as those by Baumgartner and Massacci [4].
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Finally, an intriguing path suggested by an anonymous reviewer is representing inte-
gers with Gray codes such that the bit-wise representions of n and n+1 also diOer by
one bit. This might give SAT solvers with lemmaizing a competitive edge on this kind
of problems: lemmas could more easily cut oO a large portion of the search space.
However, the design of combinatorial arithmetic circuits (addition, multiplication and
two-complement substraction) for these codes is a research problem in itself.
We leave these issues open for future investigations.
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